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Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
Access to Justice: 
The Social Responsibility of Lawyers 
Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional 
Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers 
in the Twenty-First Century 
Hon. E. Norman Veasey 
I am very honored to be invited to present the lecture this year in 
honor and in memory of Dean Tyrrell Williams of this superb law 
school. His distinguished service here as professor and dean spanned 
a thirty-three year period in our nation’s history from 1913 to 1946, 
covering two World Wars, the Great Depression, and social as well 
as industrial sea changes. He guided this law school well, as my good 
friend Dean Seligman guides it today. 
I believe Dean Williams, if he were here today, and Dean 
Seligman, who is very much a presence here today as well as a 
national force in legal education and thought, would agree that we are 
now in a new period of sea changes. One can look at many facets of 
the changes that have already occurred in this young, twenty-first 
century. 
 
  Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware. This Article includes remarks 
prepared for delivery by Chief Justice Veasey in presenting the annual Tyrrell Williams Lecture 
on October 28, 2002, at the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri. 
Significant events have transpired after the presentation of this lecture, particularly with respect 
to action by the Securities & Exchange Commission in promulgating rules mandated by Section 
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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We survived the electronic worry known as Y2K that surrounded 
the turn of the century. We saw a presidential election narrowly 
decided in the Supreme Court. We experienced the horrors of 
September 11th. We are painfully working our way through the war 
on terrorism. We have the uncertainties of the threats posed by Iraq 
and North Korea. We have also faced the upheavals and corporate 
and ethical sea changes brought about at many levels as a result of 
the collapse of Enron and other major corporations. The aftermath of 
these changes is the springboard for my remarks, because I think it 
will be the corporate lawyers who will either bring us out of—or sink 
us deeper into—this morass. 
There is, of course, considerable recent foment in the United 
States arising out of the collapse of Enron and other corporate 
disasters. I cannot comment on the Enron litigation or the other cases 
because of the constraints of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. But it is 
safe to say that this foment has provoked debate about the 
effectiveness of standards governing directors as the principal engine 
driving Corporate America, as well as the lawyers who counsel them. 
In recent months, the developments in both Corporate America 
and Congress have raised some fundamental questions. Corporate 
scandals, the dramatic decline in the stock markets, and Congress’s 
rush to achieve a legislative fix have left investors, directors, and 
lawyers breathless. These events raise fundamental questions of 
federalism, among other issues. 
The media has devoted considerable “ink” to the provisions and 
long range implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 with its strong 
federal regulatory bent, affecting corporate officers, directors, 
accountants, and lawyers. Sarbanes-Oxley impacted but did not 
substantially preempt state corporation laws, like Delaware’s, that 
govern the internal affairs of corporations. Also, listing requirements, 
such as those recently adopted by the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and NASDAQ, which have been submitted for approval to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), will have a 
significant impact on internal corporate affairs.  
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7245-66 (2002). 
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Likewise, Sarbanes-Oxley did not take over traditional state-based 
ethics rules and disciplinary enforcement, but did make some inroads. 
I would like to briefly discuss some of the corporate governance and 
ethical issues, beginning with some perspective on state corporation 
law. 
I. STATE CORPORATION LAWS 
State corporation law, both statutory and judge-made, is the 
organic governing body of law that determines investor rights and 
director duties, and governs the internal affairs of corporations. 
Absent specific congressional preemption, federal law is not designed 
to regulate the internal affairs of corporations.2 Federal law, primarily 
in the disclosure area, does affect the conduct of corporate directors 
and officers. The interaction and tension between state and federal 
law in the corporate/securities arena traditionally implicates a delicate 
federalism balance that could significantly be tipped by aggressive 
federal action.  
State incorporation statutes are largely enabling acts that provide 
directors and stockholders with considerable latitude for private 
ordering, consistent with investor protection. Delaware decisional 
law also contemplates a large role for the courts on a case-by-case 
basis in applying the directors’ fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and 
good faith. The courts’ enforcement of these fiduciary duties must 
balance entrepreneurial risk-taking with investor protection. 
My thesis is that the Delaware model works well overall, both for 
stockholders and management, but that one should be cautious in 
concluding that current events should dictate a new, more regulatory, 
federally-based regime of corporate governance. Any precipitous sea 
change in corporate governance could well have an adverse effect on 
investor value.  
Interestingly, New York University Law School Professor Robert 
Daines recently wrote a comprehensive article on the subject of 
investor value in Delaware corporations.3 Additionally, in a summary 
 
 2. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). 
 3. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 
(2001). 
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published in the Autumn 2002 edition of the New York University 
Law School Magazine, Professor Daines stated, in part: 
I examined the market valuation of 4,481 exchange-traded 
firms between 1981-1996 and I found that Delaware firms are 
(a) worth significantly more than firms incorporated elsewhere 
and (b) significantly more likely to receive takeover bids and 
to be acquired. These results are consistent with the theory that 
Delaware law facilitates the sale of public firms through its 
relatively clear and mild takeover law, expert courts, and 
because its political economy makes it relatively unlikely to 
protect a firm’s managers from takeover. 
 I found no support for the claim that managers harm 
shareholders by incorporating in Delaware or that federal 
regulation of firm governance is required because Delaware 
law is relatively harmful to investors.4 
At the end of the day, the enabling model, at least in Delaware, 
rests on a two-fold trust in the board of directors and in the judiciary. 
That trust, in turn, is predicated on two fundamental principles. The 
first is character, and by that I mean integrity, expertise, diligence, 
good faith, independence, and professionalism. These qualities are 
important both in directors and in the courts. The second fundamental 
principle is a coherent economic rationale dedicated to the best 
interests of stockholders.  
First, the directors. All the attributes of character are important. 
Perhaps the most effective stockholder protection device is the 
independence of directors. Stockholders vote for directors and expect 
proper governance from them. Their expectation is a strong bond of 
trust which is vested in the directors whose primary motivation must 
be in the best interest of stockholders. Competent and ethical 
corporate counselors are a key ingredient of proper corporate conduct 
by directors.  
 
 4. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Matter?, NYU: THE LAW SCHOOL MAGAZINE, 
Autumn 2002, at 17, 20, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/magazines/autumn02/LSMGF 
NEW03.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2002). But see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing 
Delaware Effect (forthcoming 2003). 
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Second, the courts. The courts enforce the trust vested in the 
directors. Courts should be reluctant to interfere with the good faith 
business decisions of directors and should not create surprises or wild 
doctrinal swings in their expectations of directorial behavior. 
Investors, as the owners of corporations, have certain expectations of 
the role of courts in the enforcement of fiduciary duties. Central to 
these expectations is the assumption that courts will be prompt, fair, 
clear, predictable, stable, and economically coherent.5 In enforcing 
both the statutes and fiduciary duties, courts must be firm when 
violations occur and realistic in fostering good faith entrepreneurial 
risk-taking. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD 
Under state statutory law, the business and affairs of the 
corporation are to be managed by, or under the direction of, the board 
of directors. The board hires management, personified by the CEO, 
while management makes most of the “enterprise decisions” (e.g., 
whether the plant should be in Peoria or Pittsburgh or London or 
Liverpool). Thus, enterprise decisions are distinguishable from 
“ownership decisions.” The interests of stockholders are directly 
affected by ownership decisions, which can sometimes happen in 
corporate mid-life, but which usually come as a part of final period 
decisions (such as mergers). 
The overarching concept of corporate internal affairs revolves 
around the standard of conduct for directors, as distinct from the 
standard of review which is applied by courts to director conduct.6 
Standards of conduct are the aspirational standards that directors 
should follow in carrying out their responsibilities to either manage 
or direct the management of the corporation’s business and affairs. 
That is, directors shall act loyally, with due care, in good faith, and in 
the honest belief that they are acting in the best interest of the 
corporation. I would exhort today’s directors to seek expert 
 
 5. E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002). 
 6. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.30 and § 8.31 (2001) (codifying standards of director conduct and director liability). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Veasey book pages.doc  4/9/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 12:1 
 
counseling and to implement best practices in carrying out these 
standards of conduct.  
The courts apply varying standards of review to the standards of 
conduct that is expected by corporations of their directors. Thus, a 
director’s breach of a standard of conduct may or may not result in 
liability. 
III. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The keystone of state-based corporation law is the business 
judgment rule. Investors expect directors to take prudent, good faith 
business risks for the economic gain of the enterprise. Courts are ill-
equipped to second-guess business decisions, so they focus on 
process and honesty. The business judgment rule can be stated in 
various ways. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court stated in the 
Disney case of Brehm v. Eisner that: 
The business judgment rule has been well formulated by 
Aronson and other cases. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 
(“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the corporation.”). Thus, directors’ decisions will be 
respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack 
independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, 
act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business 
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process 
that includes the failure to consider all material facts 
reasonably available.7 
As we parse this formulation, note that each key element of the 
rule is important in an analysis of the standards of director conduct 
and in the standards of court review.  
 It is a presumption, which merely means that a person 
challenging director conduct for liability purposes must 
present a particularized pleading, and ultimately proof, to 
 
 7. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). 
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rebut the presumption. Importantly, the presumption is 
rebuttable. 
 Business decision, which means that only one of the two 
principal functions of directors is implicated. The business 
judgment rule applies only to decisions of directors. The 
directors’ oversight function is not implicated in the 
analysis of the traditional business judgment rule, although 
directors do use judgment in carrying out their oversight 
function. Like directors’ decisions, however, the oversight 
function is also subject to a fiduciary duty analysis.  
 Acted on an informed basis, which means that directors 
must have exercised due care in considering all material 
information reasonably available before making a business 
decision. 
 In good faith, which means that either the director’s 
decision or the oversight function must be rationally and 
honestly carried out. 
 Honest belief in the best interests of the corporation, which 
means that the director’s motivation must be driven by the 
best interests of the corporation and its stockholders and not 
on any personal, disloyal or bad faith interest. 
There are nuances surrounding court review that I do not have 
time to bore you with today. Many nuances arise in mergers and 
acquisitions, including takeovers. These nuances include the 
enhanced business judgment rule established in the Unocal/Unitrin8 
cases, enhanced scrutiny as discussed in Paramount v. QVC9 and 
Revlon,10 and entire fairness as discussed in various cases involving 
potential self-dealing.11 I leave these nuances for another day. 
 
 8. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. 
American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 9. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 10. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 11. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 
787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 805 A.2d 882 (Del. 
2002). 
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IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
What emerges from the construct of state corporation law, as 
exemplified by the Delaware corporation law, is the judge-made law 
of fiduciary duties. The judge-made law of fiduciary duties emerged 
from the construct of state corporation law, and is exemplified by the 
Delaware corporation law. The bases for these duties can be gleaned 
from the business judgment rule. There are also a number of ways to 
articulate fiduciary duties. I will simply refer to the three principal 
duties that arise out of the formulation of the business judgment rule, 
establishing the standard of conduct for directors: the duties of care, 
loyalty, and good faith.12 
 The duty of care, which is strictly process due care, means 
that directors must exercise appropriate care when making a 
business decision and in carrying out their duty of 
oversight. Thus, the concept of “substantive due care,” as 
well as tort concepts measuring whether a decision is 
“reasonable” or whether an honest mistake in a business 
decision is “negligence,” are all foreign to corporation 
law.13 Process due care itself requires that the director 
consider all material information that is reasonably 
available, and is measured by a standard of gross 
negligence.14 
 The duty of loyalty, which in its most simplified form is a 
prohibition against self-dealing or self-interest, or serving 
any interest except that of the corporation and its 
stockholders.15 
 The duty of good faith. There is some debate about whether 
this is really one of the fiduciary duties or whether it is 
subsumed in the duty of loyalty.16 Although the duty of 
 
 12. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). 
 13. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1994); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 
n.66. 
 15. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 16. See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000); Emerald Partners 
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good faith may be subsumed in the duty of loyalty, the 
opposite is not true. Thus, I think it is accurate to consider 
the duty of good faith as an additional duty beyond the duty 
of loyalty, at least for some purposes.17 Certainly a director 
who sublimates the corporate interest to his own personal 
interest is probably acting disloyally, and in bad faith as 
well. But perhaps not all bad faith conduct necessarily 
implicates the disloyal concepts of self-interest or self-
dealing.  
In my opinion, good faith requires an honesty of purpose and 
eschews a disingenuous mindset of seeming to act for the corporate 
good without genuinely caring for the well-being of the constituents 
of the fiduciary. Although the concept of good faith is not fully 
developed in the case law, an argument could be made that reckless, 
irresponsible, or irrational conduct, which is not necessarily self-
dealing or larcenous, could implicate the concepts of good faith. 
Moreover, in the new post-Enron era of corporate responsibility, 
which requires new standards to be set by federal statutes, SEC rules, 
or voluntary best practices, good faith is likely to emerge as a central 
issue of the directors’ standard of conduct. It may or may not emerge 
as a standard of liability, however. 
Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule and 
may be the functional equivalent of the waste test, or it may show 
that a decision is not made in good faith. If the board’s decision or 
conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director 
would credit the decision or conduct, bad faith may, in some 
circumstances, be inferred.18 
 
v. Berlin, 2001 WL 115340 (Del. Ch.), rev’d and remanded by 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001). See 
also DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 15.02 (2002) (“[i]t is 
difficult to see how good faith as a concept is not encompassed within the other legs of the 
‘triad’”). 
 17. Malone, 722 A.2d at 10  (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 
(Del. 1993) (“The director’s fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders has been 
characterized by this Court as a triad: due care, good faith, and loyalty.”)). 
 18. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036 (Del. Ch.). See also 
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263. 
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V. GOOD FAITH RELIANCE BY DIRECTORS 
It is important to corporate America that we have directorial 
candidates who are willing to serve, and that they be provided with 
adequate pay, indemnification, and insurance. Also, they should not 
be seen as guarantors of good results, or as preventors of the 
malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance of others. They should be 
entitled to rely in good faith on corporate documents, committees, 
and experts to a significant degree in making their business 
judgments. In this connection, the Delaware law may come to aid the 
director. 
A. Section 141(e) 
Section 141(e) provides that directors shall be “fully protected in 
relying in good faith” upon corporate records, reports of officers or 
committees of the board, or experts whom the director “reasonably 
believes” to be opining within their expertise and who have “been 
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.”19 
But if the facts cast doubt upon § 141(e)’s presumption of a director’s 
good faith reliance or selection with reasonable care, then the director 
will have fallen short of an expected standard of conduct. Whether 
the director will resultingly be exposed to liability is another question 
that will depend on the standard of review applied to the 
circumstances.20 
B. Section 102(b)(7) 
A legislative basis for making these distinctions can be found in 
the Delaware General Assembly’s 1986 enactment of section 
102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law. That statute permits the 
stockholders to include a provision in the certificate of incorporation 
which exonerates directors from personal liability in damages for 
mere due care violations.21 Nevertheless, the statute does not 
 
 19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2002) (emphasis added); see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 
261. 
 20. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002). 
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eliminate due care as a standard of conduct, so it remains not only as 
an aspiration but also as an expectation. Moreover, a breach of the 
duty of care can be a basis for equitable relief. 
In the wake of the 1985 case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,22 the 
Delaware General Assembly, and the legislatures of most states that 
followed the Delaware enactment, wanted honest and well-meaning 
directors to be willing to serve on a board and to take entrepreneurial 
risks without worrying about mere negligence suits. Stockholders 
who adopted the exoneration provisions in corporate charters were 
presumably like-minded.23 Today, in a pure due care case without 
any viable claim of violating either the duty of loyalty or the duty of 
good faith, the Delaware courts may permit a dismissal on the motion 
of a claim for damages against a corporation’s directors on the basis 
of a charter provision which incorporates section 102(b)(7).24 But 
where the claim also implicates a properly pleaded cause of action for 
violating the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, such a claim 
will survive a motion to dismiss and may implicate an entire fairness 
scope of review.25 
The precise language of section 102(b)(7) must be parsed to put 
this issue in context. The statute provides that the certificate of 
incorporation may contain: 
A provision eliminating . . . the personal liability of a director 
. . . for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a 
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate . . . 
the liability of a director: (i) for any breach of the director’s 
duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for 
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
 
 22. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. 
 23. E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681 (1998) [hereinafter Veasey, Economic Rationale]; Veasey, Should 
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice 
Versa?, Speech to the University of Pennsylvania Law School on Norms and Corporate Law 
(Dec. 8, 2000), reprinted in 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (2001). 
 24. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001). 
 25. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93-94 (Del. 2001); Malone v. Brincat, 
722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). 
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misconduct or a knowing violation of law; . . . or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit.26 
Thus, the statute, like the case law formulations of fiduciary 
duties, seems to treat the duty of good faith as separate from the duty 
of due care and the duty of loyalty. Purely as a matter of statutory 
construction, it is hornbook law that separately-stated provisions are 
presumptively separate, and the legislature is presumed to not have 
intended for provisions to be redundant.27 
As far as the Delaware case law is concerned, however, the 
jurisprudence on good faith is unresolved. Therefore, I express no 
opinion on whether or when a separate duty of good faith that is not 
subsumed in the duty of loyalty should apply upon court review, but 
both exist as standards of conduct.  
In the Caremark litigation, Chancellor Allen suggested in dictum 
that the standards of conduct of directors have emerged since the 
mid-1960s when the Delaware Supreme Court decided Graham v. 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.28 That case held that directors could not 
personally be liable for failing to actively ferret out low-level law 
violations, but could be liable if there were “red flags” that put them 
on notice of the violations. In the thirty-three years from Graham to 
Caremark, the expectation of director conduct had changed. In 
Caremark, a key issue was the emergence of the federal sentencing 
guidelines that could benefit a corporation with an effective law 
compliance system, an expectation not present in 1963 when Graham 
was decided. Indeed, in a 1980 law review article that I co-authored 
with William E. Manning, we noted that such expectations may 
already have evolved in the then seventeen years following 
Graham.29 Our view then was that because the Business Roundtable 
had declared in 1978 that “recent lapses in corporate behavior” 
 
 26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 104(b)(7) (2002). 
 27. See Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (Del. 
1994) (noting that “words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if there is a 
reasonable construction which will give them meaning”). 
 28. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 29. E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard: Safe Harbor or 
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware 
Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919 (1980). 
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emphasized the need for corporate law compliance procedures, “the 
expected role of a director has grown to include the installation of 
legal compliance systems.”30 
Counsel today need to advise directors that there may be a 
potential for personal liability for the “utter failure” (in the words of 
the Chancellor in Caremark) of the directors to assure that an 
adequate law compliance program is in place, where that failure 
amounts to a sustained or systematic failure to exercise reasonable 
oversight.31 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has not so 
squarely held. But the Supreme Court has held that there can be a 
violation of one or more of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
good faith for intentionally disseminating false financial information 
to stockholders.32 
Today, the utter failure of directors to follow the minimum 
expectations of the standards of director conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley, or 
the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules, might likewise raise a good faith 
issue. There is no definitive answer to that question, but counsel 
should advise the directors of that possible exposure, and encourage 
the utmost in good faith behavior. 
VI. DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 
Throughout the Delaware statutes and case law, the concept of 
director independence is cited as a fundamental expectation. 
Accordingly, a director’s pure independence on paper and fierce 
independent conduct in practice is almost always desirable, and is 
sometimes, but not always, required. There is no single definition of 
independence in Delaware law, although it is clear that theoretical 
independence and independent action require the absence of either 
the appearance or the reality of any directorial interests other than the 
merits of the corporate activity for the best interests of the 
 
 30. Id. at 929-30. 
 31. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 32. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (“When the directors disseminate 
information to stockholders when no stockholder action is sought, the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty and good faith apply. Dissemination of false information could violate one or more of 
those duties.”). 
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corporation and the stockholders—particularly, the minority 
stockholders.33 
For many years, I have urged seven general protocols of best 
practices. One protocol is that boards of directors should have a 
heavy majority of “purely” independent directors.34 Of course, there 
is a legitimate point of view that director independence is not always 
best for the directors because insiders who are more knowledgeable 
about the corporation, or who have more at stake, will be better 
strategic decisionmakers, as well as better managers.35 But, in my 
view, on balance, stockholder confidence is best served by a heavy 
preponderance of independent directors.36 
The proposed rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ, as well as some 
aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, require independence and provide 
some cryptic content to the concept of independence. These 
independence concepts result in a new and evolving standard of 
conduct for directors. They are not inconsistent with the Delaware 
case law expression, but they are somewhat more explicit. Yet codes 
of best practices can and should be considered for more precise 
explication.37 
Under the proposed NYSE Rules, the board of directors must 
judge whether a given director has “no material relationship” so that 
the director may be considered as independent from the corporation.38 
 
 33. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 
422, 428-29 (Del. 1997); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000). 
 34. Veasey, Economic Rationale, supra note 23, at 687-88; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 255-56 (Del. 2000). 
 35. Veasey, Economic Rationale, supra note 23, at 687 (citing Letter from Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to E. Norman 
Veasey, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware (Apr. 10, 1988) (on file with THE 
BUSINESS LAWYER, University of Maryland School of Law)); see also James D. Westphal, 
Second Thoughts on Board Independence, 23 THE CORPORATE BOARD 136 (Sept./Oct. 2002). 
 36. William T. Allen, Independence, Integrity and the Governance of Institutions, Speech 
to the National Association of Corporate Directors Annual Meeting 7-8 (Oct. 27, 1992) (on file 
with THE BUSINESS LAWYER, University of Maryland School of Law); Veasey, Economic 
Rationale, supra note 23, at 687-88. 
 37. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 n.30. 
 38. NYSE Corporate Governance Rules Proposals, § 303A(2)(a) (“No director qualifies 
as ‘independent’ unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no 
material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or 
officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company). Companies must disclose 
these determinations.”). 
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Interestingly, over fifty percent of the NYSE companies are Delaware 
corporations. A future question may arise as to whether a 
determination that a director has no material relationship for purposes 
of the NYSE Rules would involve a violation of the duty of good 
faith under Delaware law, when the deciding board was not acting in 
good faith. There is no definitive answer to that question, but at the 
end of the day, it will probably fall upon the corporation’s General 
Counsel or other outside counsel to see to it that this good faith duty 
is properly carried out. 
VII. BEST PRACTICES AND OPTICS 
Statutory law provides that the corporation shall be managed by, 
or under the direction of, the board of directors.39 This means that 
they are in charge! The directors are not merely advisors to the CEO. 
They are the people who hire and fire the CEO. They must be 
actively engaged in the development of the company’s strategic 
direction and must supervise how that direction is implemented by 
management.40 Delaware decisions which reflect that directors should 
conduct themselves in accordance with best practices is not a recent 
development and long preceded Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the 
NYSE Rules.41 
A combination of best practices, a clear record of good faith 
conduct, and hard work as directors will improve the “optics” of how 
a court will look at the issues. Moreover, the optics must be 
genuine—not just a “good show”—but good faith. For example, if 
independence is an issue, the court’s inquiry could not only include 
the resumé of the director and her relationships with both the 
corporation and other directors, but also how she has actually 
conducted herself and the practices that the corporation may have in 
place. 
The NYSE and NASDAQ Rules impose a more detailed set of 
best practices, and the same is true of Sarbanes-Oxley. Yet, in my 
 
 39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2002). 
 40. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 3-7 (3d ed. 2001); Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 1427, 1429-36 (Aug. 1995). 
 41. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256. 
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opinion, the voluntary codes of best practices should be considered as 
even more definitive. There are many examples in these voluntary 
codes, but I would like to develop here just one approach to a new 
paradigm. That paradigm focuses on independence, committee 
responsibilities, and the role of counsel. 
VIII. THE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD 
First, assuming that a heavy majority of directors should be 
independent, the voluntary codes should clearly define independence. 
Second, the Audit Committee, the Compensation Committee, and the 
Nominating/Governance Committee, all consisting 100% of 
independent directors, should have detailed charters setting forth their 
duties. Counsel should be certain that those charters are clearly 
drafted and fit the particular corporation. Counsel should also 
monitor compliance with those charters as well as law compliance 
generally. Third, the Nominating/Governance Committee (which I 
will call the “Governance Committee”) also fits the new paradigm, 
providing a good vehicle for ensuring effective best practices. 
With the help of the General Counsel or its own outside counsel, 
the Governance Committee should see to it that the right things are 
done. Time does not permit me to elaborate on the best practices that 
this committee should pro-actively superintend. All that time does 
permit me to do in these remarks is to provide a partial, topical 
checklist, as follows: 
 Define and Monitor Director Independence 
 Nominate Directors 
 Executive Sessions of Independent Directors 
 Law Compliance Systems 
 Internal Controls 
 Business Ethics Code Compliance 
 Disclosure Documents 
 Training of Directors 
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 Conflicts of Interest 
 Reporting Malfeasance, Misfeasance or Nonfeasance 
within the Corporation 
 Corporate Opportunities 
 Insider Trading 
 Stockholder Relations 
Counsel should consult experts, current literature, and her own 
common-sense professionalism in guiding the committee to employ 
the most modern implementation of the paradigm corporate culture 
that is designed to fulfill investor expectations in this dynamic area of 
corporate governance. In this new world there is pressure on all of the 
players. First, there is pressure on each director in deciding whether 
to serve on a board, to prepare for that service, and then to function as 
a director effectively, competently, and in good faith. Second, the 
pressure on the key officers—CEO, CFO and General Counsel—is 
intense. But perhaps the most intense pressure is on the General 
Counsel. The General Counsel may not only need a competent team 
of in-house lawyers, but will also need outside counsel who are either 
at his elbow or are independently counseling the various committees. 
Corporate directors must look to competent and ethical counsel to 
advise them on their fiduciary duties and to protect against fraudulent 
conduct that the lawyer may come to know. Central to this theme is 
the fact that the lawyer for the corporate entity will owe her 
allegiance only to the entity and, thereby, to its stockholders. 
This brings me to the latest developments in professional ethics 
and, in particular, how these rules apply to the lawyer for the 
corporation. 
IX. ETHICS 2000 AND THE “SEVEN C’S” 
 
Five years ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) established 
a special commission known as Ethics 2000 to review, evaluate, and 
recommend change, where necessary, to the Model Rules. The Model 
Rules were originally adopted by the ABA in 1983, and have been 
adopted in some form in over forty states. In some instances the 
states adopted important departures from the Model Rules. Moreover, Washington University Open Scholarship
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the ABA itself adopted about thirty-nine amendments to the Model 
Rules over the years. It was, indeed, time in 1997 when the Ethics 
2000 Commission was chartered to have a good hard look at the 
Rules in light of considering those changes, the dynamics of the legal 
profession, and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers that was nearing completion.  
I have had the honor to chair this extraordinary and diverse Ethics 
2000 Commission of thirteen outstanding scholars, judges, 
practitioners, and public citizens. After an open five-year process of 
over fifty meetings, ten public hearings, and many drafts exchanged 
on our website, our final product was presented to the ABA House 
for approval in the summer of 2001 and the winter of 2002. Nearly all 
of our recommendations were adopted, and now a newly-minted set 
of ABA Model Rules is under the consideration of state supreme 
courts and their advisory committees for adoption in the respective 
states. Also, the three recommendations of Ethics 2000 that were not 
approved by the ABA House are offered for consideration to the state 
supreme courts. I will later discuss one of these: Rule 1.6 on 
confidentiality. 
We did not change the basic architecture of the existing Model 
Rules. In fact, we recommended change only where necessary. As a 
result, we have a blend of the new and the time-honored existing 
Rules. To oversimplify the many provisions of the new Rules now 
printed in over 120 pages of text and comments, I would characterize 
the highlights as the “Seven C’s.” They are: 
 Competence 
 Communication 
 Candor 
 Conflicts 
 Confidentiality 
 Corporate Clients 
 Courage 
All seven are relevant in today’s environment, but my focus today 
is especially on four in the context of the professional responsibilities 
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of the corporate counselor: conflicts, corporate clients, 
confidentiality, and courage. 
First, as to conflicts, the corporate lawyer must be clear that her 
client is the corporate entity and only the corporate entity. In my 
view, she should avoid the conflicts under Rule 1.7 by not personally 
representing an officer, director, or employee.  
Second, as to the corporate client, when the corporate lawyer 
comes to know of a crime or fraud being perpetrated by an officer or 
employee, she must report that violation up the chain of command to 
the board of directors to expose and prevent the fraud within the 
corporation. This action is required by Model Rule 1.13, which sets 
forth a roadmap to direct the lawyer for the corporation to employ 
intra-corporate remedies to stop a fraud by a corporate officer or 
employee. The remedies in Rule 1.13 include going up the chain of 
command to the board of directors or the independent directors, if 
necessary. At the board level it is likely that the fraud would be 
stopped. Directors are not likely to risk jeopardizing their careers and 
reputations by allowing a corporate officer or employee to perpetrate 
a fraud or crime injuring the corporation or innocent third parties. 
Further, as to the corporate client, that client must be protected 
under Rule 4.2 by the corporate lawyer from unethical contacts with 
the key persons within the corporate client. Specifically, there may be 
attempts by outsiders, including federal and state investigators, 
without consent, legal authority, or court order, to communicate with 
current officers, directors or others who supervise, direct, or regularly 
consult with the corporation’s lawyer. New Rule 4.2 permits 
investigators some leeway, but would prohibit these attempts by 
others. This rule has been a battleground for both lawyers and state 
courts because past United States Attorney Generals have wanted to 
create a law enforcement exception to the no-contact rule. That effort 
was successfully thwarted in this city in the Eighth Circuit with the 
able service of the St. Louis trial lawyer Frank Gundlach, who 
represented the Conference of Chief Justices as amicus curiae in the 
McDonnell Douglas case.42 Later, in the McDade Amendment,43 
 
 42. United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. V 1999). 
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Congress codified the primacy of state courts over lawyer ethics 
rules. 
Third, as to confidentiality, there may be instances where the 
lawyer has properly used Model Rule 1.13, but has not been able to 
persuade the board of directors to deal with fraud by an officer. In 
addition to Rule 1.13, the Model Rules provide other avenues that 
lawyers may take to disassociate themselves from a client’s crime, 
such as a “noisy withdrawal” from the representation of a client who 
seeks to perpetrate a fraud. That is, the withdrawing lawyer may give 
“notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw 
or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.”44 
The key issue as to confidentiality is whether the lawyer should 
have the ability under Model Rule 1.6 to disclose client information 
outside of the organization, if the disclosure is reasonably necessary 
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the perpetration of a substantial fraud 
using the lawyer’s services. Ethics 2000 recommended that the 
lawyer be given that discretion in its proposed Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 
(3). Forty-one jurisdictions already permit the disclosure of a client 
confidence to prevent the client from perpetrating a fraud that 
constitutes a crime, thus departing from the Model Rule that had been 
in effect since 1983. 
This discretion was the most controversial issue before the ABA 
House, which voted against the Ethics 2000 proposal in August 2001 
and opted to stay within the narrow confines of Rule 1.6 prohibiting 
such disclosure. The lawyer’s discretion to disclose is left to his 
professional judgment, and gives the lawyer leverage within the 
corporation to prevent the fraud or crime. Interestingly, Delaware and 
Missouri—at least for the present—follow the 1983 Model Rule 1.6 
of no disclosure, putting these states in the minority among the 
current state rules. Maybe that will change in this post-Enron world, 
and maybe the ABA House will change its rule prohibiting any such 
disclosure. 
Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) of Ethics 2000, like the existing rules in 
eighty percent of the states, permits disclosure outside of the 
corporation to prevent or rectify criminal fraud. The proposed Rule 
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accomplishes at least three ends: (a) it gives the corporate lawyer 
leverage to force a satisfactory intra-corporate remedy or prevention 
while using Rule 1.13; (b) it is the ultimate recourse if the highest 
authority in the entity thumbs its corporate nose at the lawyer; and (c) 
it would bring the ABA in line with those forty-one states and the 
expectations of the public, if ultimately approved by the ABA House 
of Delegates, which one would reasonably expect in today’s 
environment.  
Finally, as to courage, I don’t believe the word is found in the 
Model Rules, but it is certainly implied by concepts of lawyer 
morality and independence found in various Rules and in the 
Preamble. It is the spirit of Atticus Finch,45 to which we must all 
aspire as members of this profession, for the corporate lawyer to be 
independent, and to employ the strength, courage, and leverage to 
force best practices and a prevention of fraud. Indeed, the lawyer 
must sometimes have the courage to “just say no” to the CEO or the 
board when they seek to embark on a questionable course of conduct. 
This is easier said than done, but it must be done when the situation 
arises. 
X. FEDERALISM ISSUES 
In July 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a result 
of the recent corporate scandals. Section 307 of the Act requires the 
SEC to adopt rules by January 2003 requiring lawyers in certain 
situations to go up the chain of command. The pertinent part of 
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to adopt 
rules 
[S]etting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in 
any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule– 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material 
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the 
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chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the 
company (or the equivalent thereof); and 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to 
the evidence . . . requiring the attorney to report the evidence 
. . . to the board of directors.46 
Although this provision is clearly an attempt to codify a 
mandatory Rule 1.13 at the federal level, there are still numerous 
drafting and scope issues that will have to be addressed. I expect that 
the SEC will clarify and resolve these and other issues in an 
appropriately clear and limited manner when it promulgates the rules 
required by the statute.  
Some may say that state corporation law or ethics rules are “too 
weak” to deal effectively with corporate misconduct, the perceived 
sloth of some directors, and the timidity or complicity of corporate 
lawyers. I do not agree with that assessment. Perhaps some who hold 
that view have been swept up in the horrors of the moment and desire 
to do anything and everything with an intent to “protect” investors or 
employees. But we must be careful. I would paraphrase the 
Hippocratic oath: Whatever we do, first do no harm! In my view, 
neither the Delaware statutory or fiduciary duty laws, nor state-based 
ethics rules, are weak. In fact, they are balanced and firm. Tipping the 
balance by excessive federal preemption could cause harm to 
investors. 
On the federalism front, as it relates to corporate governance, 
recent headlines express concern about excessive federalization and 
overregulation by Congress. Recent memoranda from various law 
firms raise these questions and offer good advice on the current 
environment, as well as examples of best practices by corporate 
boards. For example, in recent Wachtell, Lipton memoranda many 
points were made including these: 
The danger from Enron is much more the possibility of 
onerous new legislation and regulation than the likelihood of a 
change in the law with respect to director liability. If directors 
and those who are members of audit committees follow 
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customary procedures, there should be no increased liability 
exposure. 
* * * 
The courts recognize the necessity of not changing the rules 
that assure directors that they will not be held personally liable 
for even negligently failing to discover misrepresentations by 
management and the auditors, and that this assurance is critical 
to having competent, independent people continue to serve as 
directors of public companies.  
* * * 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the NYSE rules have not changed 
the business judgment rule or the other fundamental tenets of 
corporation law applicable to boards of directors; nor have 
they weakened the structures insulating directors from personal 
liability that have been developed over the years in order to 
avoid discouraging competent people from serving as 
directors. 
On the ethics front, in my opinion, federalization would be 
similarly problematic for several reasons, including some troubling 
drafting issues in the Act, enforcement mechanisms, as a well as the 
obvious potential threat to the principles of federalism. The McDade 
Act is already on the books as a federal law mandating that ethics 
rules be state-based, and thus it is important for the SEC which that 
are called for in the legislation to clarify and limit the many drafting 
and federalism concerns that are raised by the Act. Most state 
supreme courts are conducting a review of their ethics rules in this 
new environment. Sarbanes-Oxley implicates a tilt to some limited 
federal regulation of lawyers, and it is my hope that the tilt can be 
contained. We await the SEC rules implementing section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as we also await action by state supreme courts 
on a comprehensive new set of rules of professional conduct. 
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